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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In her appellant's brief, Ms. Villa-Guzman asserted the district court abused its discretion
when it ordered her to pay restitution pursuant to the State's request. She argued that the State's
Cost Sheet submitted in support of its request was not sworn and thus did not constitute
sufficient evidence. Additionally, the State's request included time spent on charges for which
she was not convicted. In response, the State avoids the merits of the sufficiency argument and
argues instead that the issue was not preserved. With respect to the fact that the Cost Sheet
included the prosecutor's time spent working on charges for which she was not convicted, the
State claims that there is no requirement that a prosecutor's requests for restitution be tied to
particular charges. Both of these arguments are specifically foreclosed by established precedent
and the plain language of the restitution statute.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms. Villa-Guzman's Appellant's Brief They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered Ms. Villa-Guzman to pay restitution?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Ms. Villa-Guzman To Pay Restitution
In its respondent's brief, the State does not challenge the merits of Ms. Villa-Guzman's
claim that the restitution award in this case was not supported by sufficient evidence because the
Cost Sheet the prosecutor submitted to the district court was not sworn. Instead, the State argues
that the issue was not preserved. (Resp. Br., pp.4-6.) The State relies on a case that is not on
point and ignores a Court of Appeals case that is specifically on point. Indeed, in State v.
Yeoumans, the Court of Appeals held that, "an appellate challenge to the sufficiency of evidence

to meet a party's burden of proof requires no specific action or argument below." 144 Idaho
871, 873 (Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added); see also State v. Ashley, 126 Idaho 694, 695-96
(Ct. App. 1994). The State relies on State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 833 (Ct. App. 2011)
(Resp. Br., p.5.), but Mosqueda did not involve a sufficiency of the evidence claim. Instead, it
concerned a claim that the restitution requested, which was based on the officer's hourly pay
rates, was not authorized under the statute. Id.
That is not the situation here.

In fact, on appeal in this case Ms. Villa-Guzman

specifically argued that the district court abused its discretion in awarding restitution because the
prosecutor's unsworn Cost Sheet did not constitute sufficient evidence and therefore did not
"constitute the 'substantial evidence' required by" LC. § 37-2732(k).

(App. Br., pp.6-7.)

Further, she argued that, due to the errors in the prosecutor's Cost Sheet, "it was impossible to
determine the State's costs actually incurred," and thus the prosecutor's "Cost Sheet did not
constitute substantial evidence to support" the requested amount of restitution. (App. Br., p.7.)
The State, choosing to rely only on its unsupported preservation claim, fails to address the merits
of this argument also. (Resp. Br., p.6.)

3

In response to Ms. Villa-Guzman's argument that the restitution award was not supported
by the plain language of the statute because the request included expenses for prosecuting all
three of the charges (App. Br., pp.8-9), the State claims that there is "no requirement that the
prosecutor's actions be tied to particular charges." (Resp. Br., p.7.) This is false. There is
indeed a requirement that restitution be tied to convictions. LC. § 37-2732(k) read as follows:
"Upon conviction of a felony or misdemeanor violation under this chapter ... the court may
order restitution for costs incurred by law enforcement agencies in investigating the violation."
Thus, while the State could potentially demonstrate that it was entitled to its costs incurred in
prosecuting the trafficking charge because Ms. Villa-Guzman was found guilty of the lesserincluded misdemeanor of that charge, it did not do so. Instead, it simply included the total hours
spent for trial preparation, and the trial itself, but included no delineation as to how many hours
were spent preparing to prosecute the trafficking charge as opposed to the other charges.
Similarly, the prosecutor's Cost Sheet did not include how many hours of the trial were
dedicated to proving the trafficking charge. Clearly, some of the hours were spent preparing for
and prosecuting the other charges.
Nevertheless, the State claims that such an approach would be impractical and asserts that
Ms. Villa-Guzman "offers no theory how the trial, much less the trial preparation, would have
been any different." (Resp. Br., p.8.) This is not Ms. Villa-Guzman's burden. It is the State's
burden to prove expenses "actually incurred" on the only charge that resulted in a conviction;
therefore, it had to delineate the expenses incurred for that charge only and not include expenses
for charges "resulting in a mistrial, acquittal, or [a codefendant's] conviction." State v. Nelson,
161 Idaho 692, 697 (2017). The prosecutor's Cost Sheet contained no such details. As such, the
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district court abused its discretion when it ordered Ms. Villa-Guzman to pay the full restitution
award requested, and the State has failed to prove otherwise.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Villa-Guzman respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's award
of restitution and remand her case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of June, 2019.

/s/ Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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